Precise XSS detection and mitigation with Client-side Templates by Pazos, Jose Carlos et al.
Precise XSS detection and mitigation with Client-side Templates
José Carlos Pazos
University of British Columbia
Jean-Sébastien Légaré
University of British Columbia
Ivan Beschastnikh
University of British Columbia
William Aiello∗
University of British Columbia
Abstract
We present XSnare, a fully client-side Cross-Site Script-
ing (XSS) solution, implemented as a Firefox extension. Our
approach takes advantage of available previous knowledge
of a web application’s HTML template content, as well as
the rich context available in the DOM to block XSS attacks.
XSnare prevents XSS exploits by using a database of exploit
descriptions, which are written with the help of previously
recorded CVEs. CVEs for XSS are widely available and are
one of the main ways to tackle zero-day exploits. XSnare
effectively singles out potential injection points for exploits
in the HTML and sanitizes content to prevent malicious pay-
loads from appearing in the DOM.
XSnare can protect application users before application
developers release patches and before server operators apply
them.
We evaluated XSnare on 81 recent CVEs related to XSS
attacks, and found that it defends against 94.2% of these ex-
ploits. To the best of our knowledge, XSnare is the first pro-
tection mechanism for XSS that is application-specific, and
based on publicly available CVE information. We show that
XSnare’s specificity protects users against exploits which
evade other, more generic, anti-XSS approaches.
Our performance evaluation shows that our extension’s
overhead on web page loading time is less than 10% for
72.6% of the sites in the Moz Top 500 [1] list.
1 Introduction
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) is still one of the most dominant
web vulnerabilities. A 2017 report showed that 50% of web-
sites contained at least one XSS vulnerability [29]. Counter-
measures exist, but many of them lack widespread deploy-
ment, and so web users are still mostly unprotected.
Informally, the cause of XSS is a lack of input sanitiza-
tion: user-chosen data “escapes” into a page’s template and
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stages of the project. We miss him dearly.
makes its way into the JavaScript engine, or modifies the
DOM. Consequently, many of the XSS defenses published
so far propose to fix the problem at the source, by properly
separating the template from the user data on the server, or
by modifying browsers [26, 30, 39, 40]. There are also similar
solutions that can be implemented in the front-end code of
an application [25]. In all cases, these technologies must be
adopted by the application software developers, otherwise
users are left unprotected.
One barrier to adoption of existing XSS defenses is that
developers may not have the necessary expertise, or sufficient
resources, to use the approach. Luckily, users wishing to gain
reassurance over the safety of the sites they visit can install
browser extensions to filter malicious scripts and content. Un-
fortunately, these extensions achieve most of their security by
disabling functionality in the applications, such as JavaScript,
which impairs the usability of the sites [2, 35]. For example,
most sites rely on JavaScript being enabled1.
When an XSS vulnerability is disclosed, some software
vendors respond with patches. If the affected software is re-
leased in the form of packages, frameworks, or libraries, and
used by several web applications, there is delay before users
can benefit from the patch. Most importantly, the patched
software must be re-deployed by site administrators.
Unfortunately, website administrators will not, and often
cannot, apply software updates immediately: one study found
that 61% of WordPress websites were running a version with
known security vulnerabilities [3]. In another report, we learn
that 30.95% of Alexa’s top 1 Million sites run a vulnerable
version of WordPress [15].
Users are in effect at the mercy of developers and adminis-
trators if they need to browse safe, up-to-date, applications.
Our solution, XSnare, helps with this problem – based on
information from past disclosures, XSnare patches known
page vulnerabilities directly in the browser.
Each layer of the web application stack (Figure 1) opens
different defence options against XSS:
1As early as 2012, it is used by almost 100% of the Alexa top 500 sites [37]
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Figure 1: Different web security solutions with XSnare on the
client-side.
1. The application logic is the first line of defence. Code
safety can be enhanced with third-party vulnerability
scanning solutions, and a thorough code-review process.
Taint, and static code analysis tools can detect unsani-
tized inputs.
2. In the hosting environment, network firewalls, specif-
ically Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) can defend
against attacks such as DDoS, SQL injections and XSS.
3. In the client’s environment (residential or commercial),
users may install network firewalls, network content fil-
ters, and web proxies.
4. The last line of defence is the browser. Browser have
built-in defences, such as Chrome’s XSS Auditor [22].
Users can also install third-party extensions to block
malicious requests and responses, such as NoScript [2],
and XSnare.
We make two observations about existing solutions: (a)
server-side solutions have to be applied independently on
each server, and (b) solutions on the client are typically writ-
ten as generic filters which attempt to catch everything, and
consequently do not take full advantage of the specificity of
the application or the vulnerability.
For example, a WAF can effectively protect the deployment
placed behind it, but users cannot realistically expect that ev-
ery site they visit be protected by one. At the opposite end,
in the client’s environment, a user might configure a network
proxy for all website traffic, with generic rules achieving max-
imum coverage, but this will often lead to an elevated rate of
false positives (FPs).
Similarly, browser built-in defences are coarse-grained, and
work on just a subset of exploits. Chrome’s XSS Auditor,
for example, only attempts to defend against reflected XSS.
Google recently announced its intention to deprecate XSS
Auditor, for reasons including “Bypasses abound”, “It pre-
vents some legit sites from working”, and “Once detected,
there’s nothing good to do” [8]. Stock et al. [38] propose
enhancements to XSS Auditor and cover a wider range of
exploits than the auditor, but are limited to DOM-based XSS.
By contrast, our work covers all types of XSS.
Implementing adequate server-side protections [23, 31, 34,
41] throughout a codebase could arguably qualify as a colos-
sal task, considering the high turnaround times for resolving
simpler bugs. A 2018 study found that the average time to
patch a CVE, all severities combined, is 38 days, increasing
to as much as 54 days for low severity CVEs, and the oldest
unpatched CVE was 340 days old [5].
Server-side defences also do not protect against client-only
forms of XSS, e.g., reflected XSS, or persistent client-side
XSS, which use a browser’s local storage or cookies as an
attack vector. Steffens et al. [36] present a study of persis-
tent client-side XSS across popular websites and find that as
many as 21% of the most frequented web sites are vulnerable
to these attacks. To provide users with the means to pro-
tect themselves in the absence of control over servers, we
strongly believe that a novel client-side solution is neces-
sary.
A number of existing solutions in this area also suffer from
high rates of false-positives and false-negatives. For example,
NoScript [2] works via domain white-listing, thus by default,
JavaScript scripts and other code will not execute. However,
not all scripts outside of the whitelist should be assumed to be
malicious. Browser-level filters like XSS Auditor work based
on general policies and can therefore incorrectly sanitize non-
malicious content.
We posit that the DOM is the right place to mitigate
XSS attacks as it provides a full picture of the web appli-
cation. While most of the functionality we provide could be
done by a network filter in front of the browser, we take ad-
vantage of additional context provided by the browser. Partic-
ularly, when an exploit occurs as a result of user interactions,
like on response to a click, we benefit from knowledge of
the initiating tab to filter the response. Previous client-side
solutions have opted for detectors that were generic and site-
agnostic [24, 26, 27]. Our work goes in the opposite direction,
and tries rather to prevent precisely-defined exploits in spe-
cific applications.
If a patch for a server-side vulnerability can be “translated”
into an equivalent set of operations to apply on the fully
formed HTML document in the browser, then we can seize
the opportunity to defend early against exploits of that vulner-
ability. Our extension, which has access to the user’s browsing
context, can identify vulnerable pages based on a database
of signatures for previous disclosures. This way, XSnare can
protect users as soon as a patch is implemented and added to
its database. The client-side patch will remain beneficial until
all server operators running that software have had a chance
to upgrade their deployments.
A similar philosophy is adopted by the client-side firewall-
based network proxy Noxes [27]. Unlike XSnare, however,
Noxes only applies generic policies based on information
available at the network layer. Namely, it does not protect
against attacks invisible to the network, e.g., deleting local
files. We believe additional contextual knowledge also offers
more accurate vulnerability detection.
We evaluate XSnare by testing it on 81 recent XSS CVEs.
We also report XSnare’s performance overhead on page load
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times across a wide range of sites and show that it does not
significantly impact browsing experience.
To summarize, our contributions include:
• XSnare: a novel client-side framework that protects users
against XSS vulnerabilities with a database of signa-
tures for these vulnerabilities, written in a declarative
language.
• A mechanism to correctly isolate a vulnerable injection
point in a web page and to apply the intended server-side
patch on the client-side.
• A collection of signatures to protect users against real
XSS CVEs (Section 5), demonstrating the practicality
of XSnare; and the evaluation of its impact on browsing
(Section 6).
2 XSnare Design
HTTP request 
(e.g., load 
example.com)
Security analyst uploads 
signature to database
User’s browser
Request processing DOM render
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Figure 2: XSnare’s approach to protect against XSS.
We now present the design of XSnare and its components.
We begin with a high-level view of its operation (see Fig-
ure 2): A user requests a page, example.com, on a browser
with the XSnare extension installed. The response may or
may not contain malicious XSS payloads. Before the browser
renders the document, XSnare analyzes the potentially mali-
cious document. The extension loads signatures from its local
database into its detector. The detector analyzes the HTML
string arriving from the network, and identifies the signatures
which apply to the document. These signatures specify one
or more “injection spots” in the document, which correspond,
roughly speaking, to regions of the DOM where improperly
sanitized content could be injected. The extension’s sanitizer
eliminates any malicious content and outputs a clean HTML
document to the browser for rendering (Algorithm 1).
2.1 An example application of XSnare
To further explain our approach, we present a small example
of how DOM context can be used to defend against XSS, taken
from CVE 2018-10309 [6]. This is reproducible in an off-the-
shelf WordPress installation running the Responsive Cookie
Consent plugin, v1.7. This is a stored XSS vulnerability, and
as such is not caught by some generic client-side XSS filters,
including Chrome’s XSS auditor.
Consider a website running PHP on the backend which
stores user input from one user, and displays it later to another
user, inside an input element.
The PHP code defines the static HTML template (in black),
as well as the dynamic input (in red):
<input id="rcc_settings[border -size]"
name="rcc-settings[border -size]"
type="text" value="<?php rcc_value(’border-size’);
?>"/>
<label class="description"
for="rcc_settings[border -size]">
Normally, the input might have a value of "0":
<input id="rcc_settings[border -size]"
name="rcc-settings[border -size]"
type="text" value="0">
<label class="description"
for="rcc_settings[border -size]">
However, the php code is vulnerable to an injection attack,
e.g.:
border -size = ""><script >alert(’XSS ’)</script >
The browser will render this, executing the injected script:
<input id="rcc_settings[border -size]"
name="rcc-settings[border -size]"
type="text" value=""><script>alert(’XSS’)</script>
<label class="description"
for="rcc_settings[border -size]">
Note that the resulting HTML is well-formed, so a mere
syntactic check will not detect the malicious injection. Let us
assume a security analyst knows the original template, i.e.,
without injected content. If the analyst were given a filled-in
document, they could (in most cases) separate the injected
content from the server-side template, and get rid of the mali-
cious script entirely, using proper sanitization.
The injected script is bounded by template elements with
identifiable attributes. Assuming (for now) that there is only
one such vulnerable injection point, we can search for the
input element from the top of the document, and the label
from the bottom to ensnare the injection points in the HTML.
This shares goals with the client/server hybrid approach
of Nadji et al. [30]. They automatically tag injected DOM
elements on the server-side using a taint-tracking, so that the
client (a modified browser) can reliably separate template vs
injected content. We do not require any server-side modifica-
tions, but rather opt for a client-side tagging solution based
on exploit definitions.
The injected content, once identified, must be sanitized
appropriately. The appropriate action will depend on the ap-
plication setting, but assuming a patch has been written, it
suffices to translate the intention in the server code’s path to
the client-side. This can be straightforward, once the fix is
understood.
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The developer incorrectly claimed the bug had been fixed in
version 1.8 of the plugin. Other similar vulnerabilities had in-
deed been fixed, but not this one [11]. The built-in WordPress
function sanitize_text_field needed to be applied.
XSnare does not automatically determine the relevant ac-
tions to implement from a patch. We assign this task to a
security analyst, who will act as the signature developer for a
given exploit. The system will however automate the signa-
ture matching and sanitization.
2.2 XSnare Signatures
Our signature definitions make two assumptions: first, an
injection must have a start point and end point, that is,
an element can only be injected between a specific HTML
node and its immediate sibling in the DOM tree; second,
in a well-formed DOM, the dynamic content will not be
able to rearrange its location in the document without
JavaScript execution (e.g., removing and adding elements),
allowing us to isolate it from the template.
Pages commonly contain more than one vulnerable injec-
tion point. We discuss the difficulty of supporting these pages
in Section 2.5.
We believe CVEs are an ideal growing source of signature
definitions. Since previous client-side work does not focus
on application-specific protection, these tools often use less
accurate heuristics to detecting exploits. Furthermore, once
new vulnerabilities are found, these systems often lack the
maintainability obtained by leveraging active CVE develop-
ment.
We are conscious that XSnare signatures will not write
themselves, and that this task represents a new step in the
workflow. Luckily, converting the CVE information into a
signature does not require active participation from the appli-
cation developers – Security enthusiasts and web developers
have the skills to fulfill this role satisfactorily.
In general, we do not require the existence of a publicly
disclosed CVE to be able to write a signature for an exploit,
it is the process of its development that is useful to our ap-
proach (documenting an exploit and its cause). As described
in Section 5, CVEs are a convenient way for us to test our
system against real-world vulnerabilities. However, a knowl-
edgeable analyst can write a signature without having publicly
disclosed a CVE. In fact, for security measures, many CVEs
are not publicly available until the application developer has
patched its software. Our system can help defend against zero
day attacks, as once a vulnerability is known, an analyst is
able to write a signature for it as soon as they have knowledge
of the issue.
Long term, we imagine that volunteers (or entrepreneurs)
would cultivate and maintain the signature database. New
signatures could be contributed by a community of amateur
or professional security analysts, in a manner not so different
from how antispam or antivirus software is managed.
The challenge of automatically deriving signatures from
detailed CVEs is an interesting one, albeit outside the scope
of this paper.
2.3 Firewall Signature Language
Our signature language needs to be such that it has enough
power of expression for the signature writer to be precise, both
for determining the correct web application and to identify
the affected areas in the HTML. For injection point isolation,
a language based on regular expressions suffices to express
precise sections of the HTML. The following is the signature
that defends against the motivating example of Section 2.1:
Listing 1: An XSnare signature
url:
’wp-admin/options -general.php?page=rcc-settings ’,
software: ’WordPress ’,
softwareDetails: ’responsive -cookie -consent ’,
version: ’1.5’,
type: ’string ’,
typeDet: ’single -unique ’,
sanitizer: ’regex ’,
config: ’/^[0-9](\.[0-9]+)?$/’,
endPoints:
[’<input id="rcc_settings[border -size]"
name="rcc_settings[border -size]" type="text"
value="’,
’<label class="description"
for="rcc_settings[border -size]">’]
A description of the development process for this signature
is given in Section 4.1. In summary, a signature will have the
necessary information to determine whether a loaded page has
a vulnerability, and specify appropriate actions for eliminating
any malicious payloads.
Analysts configure their signatures with one function cho-
sen from the static set of sanitization functions offered by
XSnare. These functions inoculate potentially malicious in-
jections based on the DOM context surrounding the injection.
The goal of signatures is to provide such sanitization, ide-
ally without “breaking” the user experience of the page. The
default function preset is DOMPurify’s [25] default configu-
ration, which takes care of common sanitization needs [12].
However, DOMPurify’s defaults can be unnecessarily restric-
tive, in which cases the other sanitization methods are more
desirable.
We considered allowing arbitrary sanitization code in signa-
tures. While it would open complex sanitization possibilities,
we have decided against it, principally for security reasons.
The minimal set of functions we settled on also sufficed to
express all of the signatures defined for this paper. See Ap-
pendix B for more details.
2.4 Browser Extension
Our system’s main component is a browser extension which
rewrites potentially infected HTML into a clean document.
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The extension detects exploits in the HTML by using signa-
ture definitions and maintains a local database of signatures.
We leave the design of an update mechanism to future work,
but in its current form, the database is bundled with each new
installation of the extension.
The extension translates signature definitions into patches
that rewrite incoming HTML on a per-URL basis, according
to the top-down, bottom-up scan described in Section 2.1.
The extension’s detector acts as an in-network filter. We
initially considered other designs but quickly found out that
applying the patch at the network level was necessary for
sanitization correctness: even before any code runs, parsing
the HTML into a DOM tree might cause elements to be re-
arranged into an unexpected order, making our extension san-
itize the wrong spot. Consider the following example, where
an element inside a <tr> tag is rearranged after parsing the
string:
<table class="wp-list -table">
<thead >
<tr>
<th></th>
<img src="1" onerror="alert(1)">
<th>
<form method="GET" action=""> ...
In this HTML, the signature developer might identify the
exploit as occurring inside the given table. However, if we
wait until the string has been parsed into a DOM tree to
sanitize, the elements are rearranged due to <tr> not allowing
an <img> as its child:
<img src="1" onerror="alert(1)">
<table class="wp-list -table">
<thead >
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>
<form method="GET" action=""> ...
Note that the injected <img> tag is now outside of the table,
simply by virtue of the DOM parsing. Now, the extension
will search past the injection, as it occurs before the table
element, creating a false negative (FN). Similarly, elements
rearranged inside an injection point can create false positives.
This example would generate a class of circumvention tech-
niques for our detector, so we can’t wait until the website
has been rendered to analyze the response. This guarantees
that a knowledgeable attacker can not take advantage of this
behavior.
2.5 Handling multiple injections in one page
In Listing 1, the endPoints were listed as two strings in the
incoming network response. However, there are cases where
arbitrarily many injection points can be generated by the
application code, such as a for loop generating table rows.
For these, it is hard to correctly isolate each endPoint pair, as
an attacker could easily inject fake endPoints in between the
original ones.
*
*
b)
a)
Figure 3: Example attacker injection when multiple injection
points exist in the page. a) a basic injection pattern. b) an
attempt to fool the detector.
In Figure 3a, the brackets indicate a template. The content
in between is an injection point (the star), where dynamic con-
tent is injected into the template. In the case of a vulnerability,
the injected content can expand to any arbitrary string. The
signature separates the injection from the rest by matching for
the start and end points (the endPoints), represented by the
brackets. This HTML originally has two pairs of endPoint
patterns.
In Figure 3b, the attacker knows these are being used as
injection end points and decides to inject a fake ending point
and a fake starting point (the dotted brackets), with some
additional malicious content in between. If just looking for
multiple pairs of end points, the detector cannot tell the differ-
ence between the solid and dotted patterns, and will not get
rid of the content injected in the star. Therefore, we have to
use the first starting point and the last ending point before a
starting one (when searching from the bottom-up) and sani-
tize everything in between. This might get rid of a substantial
amount of valid HTML, so we defer to the signature devel-
oper’s judgment of what behavior the detector should follow.
We expand upon this further in Section 4.1.
* + +
Figure 4: Example attacker injection when multiple distinct
injection points exist in the page.
Figure 4 illustrates a case when there are several injec-
tion points in one page, but each of them is distinct. Now,
the filter is only looking for one pair of brackets, so the at-
tacker can’t fool the extension into leaving part of the injection
unsanitized. However, they could, for example, inject an ex-
tra ending bracket after the opening parenthesis (or an extra
starting brace). The extension will be tricked into sanitizing
non-malicious content, the black pluses (+). This behavior
can be detected by noting that we know the order in which
the endPoints should appear, and so if the filter sees a clos-
ing endPoint before the next expected starting endPoint, or
similarly, a starting endPoint before the next expected closing
endPoint, this attack can be identified. In the diagram, the
order of the solid elements characterizes the possible malfor-
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mations in the end points. As with the previous scenario, we
have to sanitize the outermost end points, potentially deleting
non-malicious content. The signature developer specifies the
sanitization behavior.
Note that these complex cases do not mean that our ap-
proach is not always applicable. The process of writing the
signature might become more complicated, but the extension
provides a choice for blocking the page entirely if the sig-
nature writer believes a given case is too complex for our
signature language.
2.6 Dynamic injections
The top-level documents of web pages fetch additional dy-
namic content via fetch or AJAX APIs. Content fetched in
this way is also vulnerable to XSS, and must be filtered. An ex-
ample vulnerability is CVE-2018-7747 (WordPress Caldera
Forms, which allows malicious content retrieved from the
plugin’s database to be injected in response to a click.
XSnare allows XHR requests to be filtered with xhr-type
signatures. To reduce the number of signatures that need to
be considered when a browser issues a request, we require
that signatures for XHR be nested inside a signature for a top-
level document. If a page’s main content matches an existing
top-level signature description, XSnare will then enable all
nested XHR listeners.
Signatures for dynamic requests are specified in the
listenerData key, which includes a listener type and method.
The idea is extensible to scripts and other objects loaded sep-
arately from the main document (e.g., images, stylesheets,
etc.).
Listing 2: An example dynamic request signature. This
patches CVE-2018-7747.
...
listenerData: [{
listenerType: ’xhr’, listenerMethod: ’POST ’,
sanitizer: ’escape ’, type: ’string ’,
listenerUrl: ’wp-admin/admin -ajax.php’,
typeDet: ’single -unique ’,
endPoints: [’<p><strong >’, ’[AltBody]’]
}]
3 Implementation
We implemented our system as an extension in Firefox 69.0.
Our signatures are stored in a local JavaScript file in the ex-
tension package. We decided on an extension implementation
for several reasons. (1) Privileged execution environment. The
extension’s logic lies in a separate environment from the web
application code. This guarantees that malicious code in the
application cannot affect the extension. (2) Web application
context. Our solution requires knowledge of the application’s
context. The extension naturally retains this context. (3) Inter-
position abilities. As it lies within the browser, the extension
Algorithm 1: Network filter algorithm
1 //global DBSignatures
2 procedure verifyResponse (responseString, url)
3 loadedProbes = runProbes(responseString, url)
4 signaturesToCheck← []
5 for probe in loadedProbes do
6 signaturesToCheck.append(DBSignatures[probe])
7 end
8 filteredSignatures← []
9 for signature in signaturesToCheck do
10 if responseString and url match signature then
11 filteredSignatures.push(signature)
12 end
13 versionInfo← loadVersions(url, loadedProbes)
14 endPoints← []
15 for signature in filteredSignatures do
16 if (signature,signature.version) ∈ versionInfo
then
17 endPoints.push(signature.endPointPairs)
18 end
19 indices← []
20 for endPointPair in endPoints do
21 indices.push(findIndices(responseString,
endPointPair))
22 end
23 if discrepancies exist in indices then
24 Block page load and return
25 for endPointPair in endPoints do
26 sanitize(responseString,indices)
27 end
28 end
can run both at the network level, e.g., rewrite an incoming
response; and at the web application level, e.g., interpose on
the application’s JavaScript execution.
3.1 Filtering process
Algorithm 1 describes our network filtering process: once a
request’s response comes in through the network, we process
it and sanitize it if necessary.
Loading signatures Our detector loads signatures and
finds injection points in the document. However, not all sig-
natures need to be loaded for a specific website, since not
all sites run the same frameworks. When loading signatures,
we proceed in a manner similar to a decision tree. The de-
tector first probes the page (line 3) to identify the underlying
framework (the software in our signature language). We cur-
rently provide a number of static probes. However, as more
applications are required to be included, we believe it would
be better to cover this task in the signature definitions. The
widely popular network mapping tool Nmap [10] uses probes
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in a similar manner, kept in a modifiable file. As mentioned
in Section 5, we currently only have signatures for CMS ap-
plications. Our probes use specific identifiers related to the
application, as well as the particular site that is affected by the
exploit. WordPress pages, for example, have several elements
in the page that identify it as a WordPress page. While this
might seem easier for CMS style pages, and we acknowledge
that application fingerprinting is a hard problem in general,
we believe other web apps will also have similar identifying
information, like headers, element ID’s, script/CSS sources,
etc.
After running these probes, the detector loads correspond-
ing frameworks’ signatures and filters out checks whether the
information of each loaded signature matches the page (lines
5-12).
Version identification We then apply version identifica-
tion (lines 13-16). Our objective for versioning is that our
signatures don’t trigger false positives on websites running
patched software. We found this to be one of the harder as-
pects of signature loading. In many Content Management
Systems (CMSs), for example, file names are not updated
with the latest versions, or do not include them at all, and thus,
this information is often hard to come by from the client-side
perspective. This information is often more available to ad-
mins of a site. While this might not be the bulk of users, it is
the bulk of disclosed CVEs, as described in Section 5.
Furthermore, we believe that even if we load a signature
when the application has already been fixed at the server-
side, it will often preserve the page’s functionality, as many
of the CVEs are a result of unsanitized input. Motivated by
this observed behavior, our mechanism follows a series of
increasingly accurate but less applicable version identifiers:
first, we apply framework specific version probes. If these are
not successful, the signature language provides functionality
for version identification in the HTML through regex. If in-
formation is unavailable through the HTML, the version in
the signature is left blank and the patch is applied regardless
of version, as we can not be sure the page is running patched
software. Our tool takes advantage of having perfect knowl-
edge of an exploit’s conditions, which reduces the rate of false
positives compared to a software-agnostic approach.
Injection point search and sanitization Once we have
the correct signatures, we find the indices for the endpoints
using our top-down, bottom-up scan, and need to check for
potential malformations in the injection points, as described
in Section 2.5 (lines 19-24). The page load is blocked and
a message is returned to the user, or if the signature devel-
oper specifies so, sanitization proceeds on the new endpoints.
Finally, if all endPoint pairs are in the expected order, we
sanitize each injection point (lines 25-27).
3.2 Sanitization methods
We provide different types of sanitization: "DOMPurify",
"escape", and "regex". Regex Pattern matching can be partic-
ularly effective when the expected value has a simple repre-
sentation (e.g., a field for only numbers). For each of these
approaches, the signature can specify a corresponding config
value. DOMPurify provides a rich API for additional configu-
ration. When escaping, defining specific characters to escape
via regex can be useful. For pattern matching via regex, config
specifies the value the injected should match.
4 Writing Signatures
We expect a signature developer to have a solid understanding
of the principles behind XSS, as well as web applications,
HTML, CSS and JavaScript, so they can identify precise in-
jection points. In this section, we aim to show that minor
effort is required from a knowledgeable analyst when writing
a signature.
4.1 Case Study: CVE-2018-10309
Going back to our example in Section 2.1, we describe the
process for writing a signature using one of our studied CVEs.
Identifying the exploit. An entry in Exploit Database [18]
describes a persistent XSS vulnerability in the WordPress
plugin Responsive Cookie Consent for versions 1.7/1.6/1.5.
This entry (as most do) comes with a proof of concept (PoC)
for the exploit, which describes the Cookie Bar Border Bot-
tom Size parameter as vulnerable. We run a local WordPress
installation with this plugin. In general, the system does not
rely on the existence of a PoC, we personally relied on this
as we did not discover the CVEs and did not have the full
context of the exploit.
Establishing the separation between dy-
namic and static content. We insert the string
">script>alert(’XSS’)</script> in the Cookie Bar
Border Bottom Size (rcc_settings[border-size] in the HTML)
input field. This results in an alert box popping up in the
page.
In general, the analyst is able to find the vulnerable HTML
from the server-side code without having to reproduce the
exploit. Since we did not write the CVE, we had to do this
extra step.
In the example, the input element is the injection starting
point, and the label tag is the end point, since it is the ele-
ment immediately after the input. Identification of correct
endpoints is extremely important, and in particular, when a
page has multiple injection points, the signature developer
must ensure the chosen elements do not overlap with other
innocuous ones. In some cases, the developer might think it
best to completely stop the page from loading. While one of
our main goals is to maintain the page’s usability, there are
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cases where large portions of the document would be affected
by the sanitization. We believe compromising usability for
security is preferable in this case. Furthermore, the developer
has to identify if the exploit comes from an external source
(such as an Ajax request), as this changes the signature.
Collecting other required page information and writ-
ing the signature. The next step is to gather the remain-
ing information to determine whether the signature ap-
plies to the page loaded. The full signature for this ex-
ample was previously shown in Listing 1. The URL
is acquired by noting that this exploit occurs on the
plugin’s settings page. The software running is Word-
Press in this case. The settings page’s HTML includes
a link to a stylesheet with href "http://localhost:8080/wp-
content/plugins/responsive-cookie-consent...", in particular,
"wp-content/plugins/plugin-name" is the standard way of
identifying that a WordPress page is running a certain plugin,
in this case, "responsive-cookie-consent", set as softwareDe-
tails. We apply the signature for all versions less than or equal
to 1.7. Since the exploit only occurs in this specific spot in
the HTML, the typeDet is listed as "single-unique". Since the
vulnerable parameter is a border-size, the sanitizer applied
is "regex", further restricting the pattern to only numbers in
config. We list the endPoints as taken from the HTML.
Testing the signature. Finally, we load up our extension
and reload the web page. We expect to not have an alert box
pop up, and we manually look at the HTML to verify correct
sanitization. In practice, there might be small discrepancies
between server-side and client-side representations of the
HTML string, leading to bugs in the signature if the developer
used the parsed HTML as a reference. If the exploit is not
properly sanitized, the developer is able to use the debugging
tools provided by the browser to check the incoming network
response information seen by the extension’s background
page and make sure it matches the signature values.
5 Approach evaluation
To verify the applicability of our detector and signature lan-
guage, we tested the system by looking at several recent CVEs
related to XSS. We have three objectives: to verify that our
signature language provides the necessary functionality to
express an exploit and its patch, to test our detector against
existing exploits, and to show that composing signatures takes
a reasonable amount of time.
5.1 Methodology
We study recent CVEs related to WordPress plugins. We focus
on WordPress for two reasons:
1. WordPress powers 34.7% of all websites according to
a recent survey [16] [28]. The same study states that
30.3% of the Alexa top 1000 sites use WordPress. Thus,
we can be confident that our study results will hold true
for the average user.
2. WordPress plugins are popular among developers (there
are currently more than 55,000 plugins [19]). Due to its
user popularity, WordPress is also heavily analyzed by
security experts. A search for WordPress CVEs on the
Mitre CVE database [17] gives 2310 results. Plugins,
specifically, are an important part of this issue, 52% of
the vulnerabilities reported by WPScan are caused by
WordPress plugins [21].
We used a CVE database, CVE Details [20] to find the 100
most recent WordPress XSS CVEs, as of October 2018. For
each CVE, we set up a Docker container with a clean instal-
lation of WordPress 5.2 and installed the vulnerable plugin’s
version. For CVEs that depended on a particular WordPress
version, we installed the appropriate version. Of the CVEs
we looked at, only one occurred in WordPress core. We be-
lieve it would be harder to precisely sanitize injection points
in WordPress core, as many of the plugins have particular
settings pages where the exploits occur, and the HTML is
more identifiable. WordPress core, on the other hand, can
be heavily altered by the use of themes and the user’s own
changes. However, as evidenced by our investigation, the vast
majority of exploits occur in plugins.
Next, we reproduced the exploit in the CVE and we ana-
lyzed the vulnerable page and wrote a signature to patch the
exploit.
5.2 Results
Plugin Installations
WooCommerce 5+ million
Duplicator 1+ million
Loginizer 900,000+
WP Statistics 500,000+
Caldera Forms 200,000+
Table 1: Most popular studied WordPress plugins
Of the initial 100 CVEs, we were able to analyze 81 across
44 affected pages. We dropped 24 CVEs due to reproducibil-
ity issues: some of the descriptions did not include a PoC,
making it difficult for us to reproduce; or, the plugin code
was no longer available. In some cases, it had been removed
from the WordPress repository due to "security issues", which
emphasizes the importance of being able to defend against
these attacks.
The resulting plugins we studied averaged 489,927 instal-
lations: Table 1 shows the number of installations for the 5
most popular plugins we studied. For the vulnerabilities, 27
(35.5%) could be exploited by an unauthenticated user; 56
8
(73.7%) targeted a high-privilege user as the victim, 7 (9.2%)
had a low-privilege user as the victim, the rest affected users
of all types.
Many of the studied CVEs included attacks for which there
are known and widely deployed defenses. For example, many
were cases of Reflected XSS, where the URL revealed the
existence of an attack, e.g.,: http://<target>&page-uri=
<script>alert("\ac{XSS}")</script> While Chrome’s
built-in XSS auditor blocked this request, Firefox did not, and
so we still wrote signatures for such attacks2.
We wrote 59 WordPress signatures in total, which got rid
of the PoC exploit when sanitized with one of our three meth-
ods. Note that while a PoC is often the most simple form of
an attack, our sanitization methods, and in particular DOM-
Purify, can get rid of complex injections as well. We were
able to include several CVEs in some PoCs because they oc-
curred in the same page and affected the same plugin. Overall,
these signatures represent 71 (93.4%) signed CVEs. The 5
we were not able to sign were due to lack of identifiers in the
HTML, which would result in potentially large chunks of the
document being replaced3
After manual testing, the majority of the 71 signatures main-
tained the same layout and core functionality of the webpage.
However, 12 signatures caused some elements to be rear-
ranged, modifying the page’s visual aspect. One caused a
small part of the page to become unusable, due to the sani-
tization method (a table showing user information was now
rendered as blank). Most of the responsibility of maintaining
functionality is left to the signature developer. We found that
being precise is key to retaining functionality.
While our goal is to retain as much information of the page
as possible after sanitization, we believe that even if a part of
the page becomes unusable, this does not impact the user’s
experience as much, since many of the exploits occur in small
sections of the HTML. A usability study is out of scope for
this paper and we leave it to future work.
5.3 Generalizability beyond WordPress
To test the generalizability of our approach to other frame-
works, we analyzed 5 additional CVEs, 2 related to Joomla!,
2 for LimeSurvey, and 1 for Bolt CMS. We chose Joomla!
because it is another popular CMS. Unfortunately, we only
found 2 CVEs that we were able to reproduce, as the soft-
ware for its extensions is often not available. For fairness, we
looked for the most recent CVEs we could reproduce listed in
the Exploit Database [7], since these have recorded PoCs. We
carried out the same procedure as with the WordPress CVEs,
and were able to patch all of the 5 exploits. This brought our
CVE coverage rate up to 94.2%.
2In practice, we found several cases where even XSS auditor did not block
a reflected XSS.
3In these cases, the signature developer can weigh the trade-offs and
decide whether the added cost is worth it.
5.4 Signature writing times
Figure 5 plots a histogram of the times it took one of the au-
thors to compose each of the signatures. Each time measure-
ment includes the time it took to check the HTML injection
points, write the signature and to debug it. We do not include
the time taken to discover and carry out an exploit, as this
is part of the CVE writing process. The median time is 3.89
minutes, and the standard deviation is 4.18 minutes. 72% of
signatures were written in under 5 minutes. We believe this
to be a reasonable amount of time considering the security
granted by our extension.
The signature which took the longest time to write (25
minutes) corresponds to an exploit with 12 HTML injection
points. Additionally, testing this signature proved difficult,
as some of the injections were a result of a script inserting
elements in the DOM after the page had loaded. This caused
the initial HTML to look innocuous, but with exploits still
occurring after sanitization. As this script was part of the
initial request, we eventually got to the root of the problem.
We believe a more experienced exploit analyst might be able
to detect this kind of behaviour more easily.
The signature which took the second longest time to write
(18 minutes) corresponds to an exploit with 7 injection points;
each of these belongs to a part of the HTML with generic
element identifiers. Our language provides a means to over-
come this, by allowing the developer to specify the element’s
"position": for example, if there are three <h3 class="title">
elements, in the HTML, and only one of them is an injection
starting point, the writer can specify that the third one needs
to be sanitized. The same can be done for the ending points.
As there were 7 of such points, debugging took longer than
for other signatures.
Another source of longer timings are complicated listener
type signatures, like the ones for exploits caused by an XHR.
We had 4 such signatures and composed these with a median
time of 9.86 minutes. As only a small number of these were
present, we expect the time taken to compose a typical signa-
ture to be lower than the overall median in this experiment.
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Figure 5: Histogram of time taken to write signatures.
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6 Load time performance on top websites
XSnare’s performance goal is to provide its security guaran-
tees without impacting the user’s browsing experience. We
now briefly report XSnare’s impact on top website load times,
representing the expected behaviour of a user’s average web
browsing experience. For more performance evaluation re-
sults please see Appendix A.
For these tests we used the top 500 websites as reported
by Moz.com [1]. For each website, we loaded it 25 times
(with a 25 second timeout) and recorded the following values:
requestStart, responseEnd, domComplete, and decodedBody-
Size. From the initial set of 500, we only report values for 441:
the other 59 had consistent issues with timeouts, insecure cer-
tificates, and network errors. In our setup, we used a headless
version of Firefox 69.0, and Selenium WebDriver for NodeJS,
with GeckoDriver. All experiments were run on one machine
with an Intel Xeon CPU E5-2407 2.40GHz processor, 32 GB
DRAM, and our university’s 1GiB connection.
We ran four test suites: No extension cold cache: Firefox
is loaded without the extension installed and the web driver is
re-instantiated for every page load. Extension cold cache: As
before, but Firefox is loaded with the extension installed. No
extension warm cache: Firefox is loaded without the exten-
sion installed and the same web driver is used for the page’s
25 loads. Extension warm cache: As before, but Firefox is
launched with the extension installed.
For each set of tests, we reduced the recorded values to two
comparisons: network filter (responseEnd - requestStart), and
page ready (domComplete - responseStart). The first analyzes
the time spent by the network filter, while the second deter-
mines the time spent until the whole document has loaded.
We calculate the medians for each website for each of these
measures as well as the decodedByteSize.
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Figure 6: Cumulative distribution of relative percentage slow-
down with extension installed for top sites.
We compare the load times with/without the extension by
calculating the relative slowdown with the extension installed
according to the following formula:
100∗ x˜with− x˜without
x˜without
where x˜ is the median with/without the extension running.
Figure 6 plots the results. The graph shows a slowdown
of less than 10% for 72.6% of sites, and less than 50% for
82% of sites when the extension is running. Note that these
values are recorded as percentages, and while some are as
high as 50%, the absolute values are in 77% of cases less than
a second. This overhead should not alter the user’s experience
significantly.
The slowdown increases by at most 5% when we take
caching into account. This is likely because the network filter
causes the browser to use less caching, especially for the
DOM component, as it might have to process it from scratch
every time. While it may seem counter-intuitive that some
pages have shorter loading times with the extension, there are
several variables at play that can affect these measurements
(local network, server-side load, internal scheduling, etc). We
manually checked the websites for which values were higher
than |40%| and verified that our extension did not change the
page’s contents, a possible cause of faster load times. We also
checked the timings for the page as reported by the browser
and noted a high variance even within small time windows.
The time spent by our verification function was less than 10ms
for 87.6% of sites (Figure 8). This corroborates our findings
that the slowdown is mostly negligible.
7 Limitations and Future Work
Generalizability and scope of study. As discussed in Sec-
tion 5.1, while many websites share similar structures to the
ones we covered, our study only considered 4 other sites apart
from those running on WordPress, and we only considered
sites using a CMS. Not all websites might be identified as
easily. Furthermore, we only studied 81 CVEs. In the future
we intend to study a more diverse set of CVEs and go beyond
CMS-based sites.
False positives and false negatives. Due to the nature of
our approach, it is extremely hard to completely get rid of
FPs: If the applied sanitization targets JavaScript code, for
example, a FP will likely be triggered. Furthermore, since
we rely on handwritten signatures to defend against attacks,
vulnerable sites for which no signature has been written will
be subject to FNs. In the future, we intend to study the rate
of FPs and FNs in our approach and compare it to previous
work.
Usability. A main aspect of our work is its increased poten-
tial for usability and adoption from both a user’s perspective
that installs the extension to defend themselves against XSS,
and a signature developer who has to write the database de-
scriptions according to a known CVE. Future work could
focus on usability studies related to both of these aspects.
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Protection against CSRF. We believe that we can adapt
our work to defend against Cross-Site Request Forgery
(CSRF) exploits, as well. Using a similar signature language
as the one for XSS, a signature developer could specify pages
with potential vulnerabilities to only allow network requests
that cannot exploit such vulnerabilities.
Dealing with an increasing number of signatures. As
the number of framework probes increases, and more types of
sites are covered, the performance impact will increase. Using
more efficient approaches to searching and filtering, and using
better data structures in the signature database could to lower
this overhead.
Design considerations. Currently, each browser user has
to install our extension. However, the same functionality could
be offloaded to a single processing unit similar to a proxy,
which can handle the filtering for all machines in a network.
This deployment model might be more appropriate in certain
environments, such as in enterprises.
8 Related Work
We classify existing work into several categories: client-side,
server-side, browser built-in, and hybrid: a combination of
these.
Server-side techniques. In addition to existing parameter
sanitization techniques, taint-tracking has been proposed as
a means to consolidate sanitization of vulnerable parame-
ters [23, 31, 34, 41]. These techniques are complementary to
ours, and provide an additional line of defence against XSS.
However, many of them rely on the client-side rendering to
maintain the server-side properties, which will not always be
the case.
Client-side techniques. DOMPurify [25] presents a robust
XSS client-side filter. The authors argue that the DOM is the
ideal place for sanitization to occur. While we agree with this
view, their work relies on application developers to adopt their
filter and modify their code to use it. Thus, we have partly
automated this step by including it as our default sanitization
function.
Jim et al. [26] present a method to defend against injec-
tion attacks through Browser-Enforced Embedded Policies.
This approach is similar to ours, as the policies specify pro-
hibited script execution points. However, this again relies on
application developers knowing where their code might be
vulnerable. Furthermore, browser modifications are required
to benefit from it. Similarly, Hallaraker and Vigna [24] use a
policy language to detect malicious code on the client-side.
Like XSnare, they make use of signatures to protect against
known types of exploits. However, unlike our approach, their
signatures are not application-specific, and there is no model
for signature maintenance. Furthermore, there is no evaluation
on the efficacy of their signatures.
Snyder et al. [35] report a study in which they disable
several JavaScript APIs and test the number of websites that
are do not work without the full functionality of the APIs. This
approach increases security due to vulnerabilities present in
several JavaScript APIs, however, we believe disabling API
functionality should only be used as a last resort.
Similarly to server-side defences, taint-tracking has been
applied at the client-side: DexterJS provides a robust, browser-
independent platform for auto-patching DOM-based XSS
[32, 33]. While this approach effectively defends against a
large number of attacks automatically, it only covers a subset
of possible XSS attack. This applies to any client-side defence
that is unaware of an application’s server-side code.
Browser built-in defences. Browsers are equipped with sev-
eral built-in defences. We previously described XSS Audi-
tor in Section 1, another important one is the Content Secu-
rity Policy (CSP) [13]. It has been widely adopted and in
many cases provides developers with a reliable way to protect
against XSS and CSRF attacks. However, CSP requires the
developer to identify which scripts might be malicious.
Client and server hybrids. XSS-Dec [39] uses a proxy
which keeps track of an encrypted version of the server’s
source files, and applies this information to derive exploits in
a page visited by the user. This approach is similar to ours,
since we assume previous knowledge of the clean HTML doc-
ument. Furthermore, they use anomaly-based and signature-
based detection to prevent attacks. However, there is no men-
tion of signature maintenance. In a way, our system offloads
all this functionality to the client-side, without the need for
any server-side information.
9 Conclusion
Users cannot depend on administrators to patch vulnerable
server-side software or for developers to adopt best practices
to mitigate XSS vulnerabilities. Instead, users should protect
themselves with a client-side solution. In this paper we de-
scribed the design, implementation, and evaluation of XSnare,
one such client-side approach. XSnare prevents XSS exploits
by using a database of exploit signatures and by using a novel
mechanism to detect XSS exploits in a browser extension. We
evaluated XSnare through a study of 81 CVEs in which we
showed that it defends against 94.2% of the exploits.
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A Performance evaluation
In this section we report additional performance measure-
ments for XSnare.
Methodology. We recorded timestamps while our code is
executing using the Performance Web API4
While our extension’s functionality only applies at the net-
work level, there is potential slowdown at the DOM process-
ing level due to the optimization techniques the browser ap-
plies throughout several levels of the web page load pipeline.
Figure 7 shows the different timestamps provided by the Nav-
igation Timing API [9], as well as a high-level description
of the browser processing model. Since our filter listens on
the onBeforeRequest event, none of the previous steps before
Request are affected. In this section, we refer to the difference
in time between responseEnd and requestStart as the "network
filter time".
Figure 7: The Navigation Timing API’s timestamps5
4Note that while this API normally reports values as doubles, due to
recent security threats, such as Spectre [28], several browser developers have
implemented countermeasures by reducing the precision of the DOMHigh-
ResTimeStamp resolution [4, 14]. In particular, Firefox reports these values
as integer milliseconds. For our tests, we re-enabled higher precision values.
5This image was taken from the w3 spec: https://www.w3.org/TR/
navigation-timing-2/
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A.1 Top websites load times; continued
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Figure 8: Scatter plot of network filter time as a function of
character length for top sites.
Figure 8 shows the time spent by the call to our string
verification function in the network filter as a function of the
length of the string to be verified. The blue dots are the pages
for which our framework probes tested negative, and the green
triangles are the pages for which the probes tested positive:
55 in total. We applied least squares regression to calculate
the shown trend lines. The Spearman’s rank 6 correlation
values for no probe, probe, and overall are 0.91, 0.91, and
0.72 respectively, demonstrating positive correlation. Since
both our probes and signatures use regex matching, we expect
both trend lines to be linear, as seen in the graph. Recall that
once a probe for a certain software passes, we perform a linear
scan over the signatures for that specific software and check
whether it applies to the given HTML string or not. Thus, we
expect the slope of the line to be higher when a probe passes.
Around 37.4% of all web sites use frameworks covered by
our probes [16], thus, we expect the impact of our network
filter to be closer to the non-probe values, as corroborated by
our overall trend line.
False positives on the Web. Additionally, for each website,
we recorded the number of loaded signatures. We report a
0% FP rate for loaded signatures. Thus, we can infer with
confidence that the rate of false positives for loaded signatures
during an average user’s web browsing is similarly low. This
rate could possibly go up as the number of signatures and
covered frameworks increases. It is likely that these websites
are free of vulnerabilities covered by our signatures, as many
of these websites are not running WordPress to begin with, and
being the most popular, they would likely be updated quickly
if a vulnerability is found; thus, the rate of false negatives is
likely extremely low as well.
A.2 WordPress websites load times
We ran similar experiments as in Section 6.1, but with the
WordPress sites described in Section 4.1. Thus, all of these
6The Spearman’s correlation coefficient measures the strength
and direction of association between two ranked variables:
https://statistics.laerd.com/statistical-guides/spearmans-rank-order-
correlation-statistical-guide.php
have either one or multiple injection points in their HTML,
and the network filter will spend an additional amount of time
sanitizing these as defined by the signatures. Note that the
data set is smaller here, and some of the trends might be harder
to infer.
Figure 9 shows the results for slowdown with the extension
running for these sites. Recall that the only difference be-
tween a page which passes the WordPress probe and one that
matches a signature is that the latter has to replace a portion
of the original string by its sanitized version. In this case we
see a slowdown of less than 10% for 60% of sites, and less
than 40% for 96.25% of them. The warm network filter curve
suffers from a particularly high slowdown. We believe this
to be the case because the locally hosted pages decrease the
network component time, causing any overhead to be seen as
relatively high. However, as 48% of the original values were
below 60ms, conclude a small impact on user experience as
well.
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Figure 9: Cumulative distribution of relative percentage slow-
down with extension installed for WordPress sites.
Finally, we report the string verification time as a function
of its length, for the WordPress sites, shown in Figure 10. The
Spearman’s rank correlation for this set of data is 0.630.
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Figure 10: Scatter plot of network filter time as a function of
character length for WordPress sites.
B Signature Language Specification
We provide a description of our signature language, in partic-
ular in the context of WordPress:
• url: If the exploit occurs in a specific URL
or subdomain, this is defined as a string, e.g.
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/wp-admin/options-general.php?page=
relevanssi%2Frelevanssi.php, otherwise null.
• software: The software framework the page is running
if any, e.g. WordPress. A hand-crafted page might not
have any identifiable software.
• softwareDetails: If running any software, this provides
further information about when to load a signature. For
WordPress, these are plugin names as depicted in the
HTML of a page running such plugin.
• version: The version number of the software/plugin/page.
This is used for versioning of the software run by the
page, as described in Section 3.1.
• type: A string describing the signature type. A value
of "string" describes a basic signature. A value of ’lis-
tener’ describes a signature which requires an additional
listener in the background page for network requests.
• sanitizer: A string with one of the following values:
"DOMPurify", "escape", and "regex". This item is op-
tional, the default is DOMPurify.
• config: The config parameters to go along with the cho-
sen sanitizer, if necessary. For "DOMPurify", the ac-
cepted values are as defined by the DOMPurify API (i.e,
DOMPurify.sanitize(dirty, config). For "escape", an ad-
ditional escaping pattern can be provided. For "regex",
this should be the pattern to match with the injection
point content.
• typeDet: A string with the following pattern:
’occurrence-uniqueness’, ’ocurrence’ has values
single/multiple, which describes the existence of one or
multiple independent injection points; the ’uniqueness’
has values unique/several, specifying whether an
injection point occurs once or several times throughout
the document, as described in Section 2.4.
• endPoints: An array of startpoint and endpoint tuples,
specified as strings for regex matching.
• endPointsPositions: An array of integer tuples. These are
optional but useful when the one of the endPoints HTML
are used throughout the whole page and appear a fixed
number of times. For example: if an injection ending
point happens on an element <h3 class=’my-header’>,
this element might have 10 appearances throughout the
page. However, only the 4th is an injection ending point.
The signature would specify the second element of the
tuple to be 7, as it would be the 7th such item in a regex
match array (using 1-based indexing), counting from the
bottom up. For ending points, we have to count from
the bottom up because the attacker can inject arbitrarily
many of these elements before it, and vice versa for
starting points.
Additionally, if the value of type is ‘listener’, the signature
will have an additional field called listenerData. Similarly to
a regular signature, this consists of the following pieces of
information:
• listenerType: The type of network listener as defined by
the WebRequest API (e.g. ‘script’, ‘XHR’, etc.)
• listenerMethod: The request’s HTTP method, for exam-
ple "GET" or "POST".
• url: the URL of the request target.
If a listener is present, the signature’s fields can be used to
specify the listener’s request injection points.
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